Arctic convoys of World War II | |||||
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Part of World War II | |||||
View from the cruiser HMS Sheffield as she sails on convoy duty through the waters of the Arctic Ocean. In the background are merchant ships of the convoy. The image was taken during the twilight of the arctic winter—the short time each day that the sun is seen during winter near the pole. In the foreground is the silhouette of a lookout using a telescope. |
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Belligerents | |||||
United Kingdom USSR Canada United States |
Nazi Germany | ||||
Casualties and losses | |||||
85 merchant vessels 16 warships |
4 warships 30 submarines |
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The Arctic convoys of World War II travelled from the United Kingdom and North America to the northern ports of the Soviet Union—Arkhangelsk and Murmansk. There were 78 convoys between August 1941 and May 1945 (although there were two gaps with no sailings between July and September 1942, and March and November 1943). About 1400 merchant ships delivered vital supplies to the Soviet Union under the Lend-Lease program, escorted by ships of the Royal Navy, Royal Canadian Navy, and the U.S. Navy. Eighty-five merchant vessels and 16 Royal Navy warships (two cruisers, six destroyers, eight other escort ships) were lost. The Nazi German Kriegsmarine lost a number of vessels including one battleship, three destroyers and at least 30 U-boats as well as a large number of aircraft.
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The Arctic convoys ran in two series, following the first convoy, which was un-numbered but code-named “Dervish”.
The first series, PQ (outbound) and QP (homebound), ran from September 1941 to September 1942. These convoys ran twice monthly, but were interrupted in the summer of 1942 when the series was suspended after the disaster of PQ17 and again in the autumn after the final convoy of the series, PQ18, due to lengthening daylight hours, and continued preparations for Operation Torch.
The second series of convoys, JW (outbound) and RA (homebound) ran from December 1942 until the end of the war, though with two major interruptions in the summer of 1943 and again in the summer of 1944.
The convoys ran from Iceland (usually off Hvalfjörður) north of Jan Mayen Island to Arkhangelsk when the ice permitted in the summer months, shifting south as the pack ice increased and terminating at Murmansk. After September 1942 they assembled and sailed from Loch Ewe in Scotland.
Outbound and homebound convoys were planned to run simultaneously; a close escort accompanied the merchant ships to port, remaining to make the subsequent return trip, whilst a covering force of heavy surface units was also provided to guard against sorties by German surface ships, such as the Tirpitz. These would accompany the outbound convoy to a cross-over point, meeting and then conducting the homebound convoy back, while the close escort finished the voyage with its charges.
The route was around occupied Norway to the Soviet ports and was particularly dangerous due to the proximity of German air, submarine and surface forces and also because of the likelihood of severe weather, the frequency of fog, the strong currents and the mixing of cold and warm waters which made ASDIC use difficult, drift ice, and the alternation between the difficulties of navigating and maintaining convoy cohesion in constant darkness or being attacked around-the-clock in constant daylight.
Several convoys are particularly notable:
Outbound | Homebound | ||||
Dervish | sailed from Hvalfjörður, Iceland 21 August 1941; arrived Arkhangelsk, August 31 | ||||
PQ 1 | sailed from Hvalfjörður, Iceland 29 September; arrived Arkhangelsk October 11 | QP 1 | departed Arkhangelsk September 28, 1941; arrived Scapa Flow October 10 | ||
PQ 2 | sailed from Liverpool, 13 October; arrived Arkhangelsk October 30 | ||||
PQ 3 | sailed from Hvalfjörður, Iceland, 9 November; arrived Arkhangelsk November 22 | QP 2 | departed Arkhangelsk November 3; arrived Kirkwall November 17 | ||
PQ 4 | sailed from Hvalfjörður, Iceland, 17 November; arrived Arkhangelsk November 28 | ||||
PQ 5 | sailed from Hvalfjörður, Iceland, 27 November; arrived Arkhangelsk December 13 | QP 3 | departed Arkhangelsk November 27; dispersed, arrived December 3 | ||
PQ 6 | departed Hvalfjörður December 8; arrived Murmansk December 20 |
Outbound | Homebound | ||
PQ 7a | departed Hvalfjörður December 26; arrived Murmansk January 12 | QP 4 | departed Archangel December 29; dispersed, arrived January 9, 1942 |
PQ 7b | departed from Hvalfjörður December 31; arrived Murmansk January 11 | ||
PQ 8 | departed Hvalfjörður January 8; arrived Archangel January 17 | QP 5 | departed Murmansk January 13; dispersed, arrived January 19 |
Combined PQ 9 and PQ 10 | departed Reykjavík February 1; arrived Murmansk February 10 | QP 6 | departed Murmansk January 24; dispersed, arrived January 28 |
PQ 11 | departed Kirkness February 14; arrived Murmansk February 22 | QP 7 | departed Murmansk February 12; dispersed, arrived February 15 |
PQ 12 | departed Reykjavík March 1; arrived Murmansk March 12 | QP 8 | departed Murmansk March 1; arrived Reykjavík March 11 |
PQ 13 | departed Reykjavík March 20; arrived Murmansk March 31 | QP 9 | departed Kola Inlet March 21; arrived Reykjavík April 3 |
PQ 14 | departed Oban March 26; arrived Murmansk April 19 | QP 10 | departed Kola Inlet April 10; arrived Reykjavík April 21 |
PQ 15 | departed Oban April 10; arrived Murmansk May 5 | QP 11 | departed Murmansk April 28; arrived Reykjavík May 7 |
PQ 16 | departed Reykjavík May 21; arrived Murmansk May 30 | QP 12 | departed Kola Inlet May 21; arrived Reykjavík May 29 |
PQ 17 | departed Reykjavik June 27; dispersed, arrived July 4 | QP 13 | departed Archangel June 26; arrived Reykjavík July 7 |
(August sailing postponed) | (August sailing postponed) | ||
PQ 18 | departed Loch Ewe September 2; arrived Archangel September 21: first convoy with aircraft carrier escort (HMS Avenger) | QP 14 | departed Archangel September 13; arrived Loch Ewe September 26 |
(PQ cycled terminated ) | QP 15 | departed Kola Inlet November 17 arrived Loch Ewe November 30 | |
Operation FB | sailings by independent unescorted ships | (QP cycled terminated ) | |
JW 51A | departed Liverpool December 15; arrived Kola Inlet December 25 | ||
JW 51B | departed Liverpool December 22; arrived Kola Inlet January 4, 1943: see Battle of the Barents Sea | RA 51 | departed Kola Inlet December 30; arrived Loch Ewe January 11, 1943 |
Outbound | Homebound | ||
JW 52 | departed Liverpool January 17; arrived Kola Inlet January 27 | RA 52 | departed Kola Inlet January 29; arrived Loch Ewe February 9 |
JW 53 | departed Liverpool February 15; arrived Kola Inlet February 27 | RA 53 | departed Kola Inlet March 1; arrived Loch Ewe March 14 |
(cycle postponed through summer) | (cycle postponed through summer) | ||
JW 54A | departed Liverpool November 15; arrived Kola Inlet November 24 | RA 54A | departed Kola Inlet November 1; arrived Loch Ewe November 14 |
JW 54B | departed Liverpool November 22; arrived Archangel December 3 | RA 54B | departed Archangel November 26; arrived Loch Ewe December 9 |
JW 55A | departed from Liverpool December 12, 1943; arrived Archangel December 22 | RA 55A | departed Kola Inlet December 22; arrived Loch Ewe January 1, 1944 |
JW 55B | departed Liverpool December 20; arrived Archangel December 30: see Battle of the North Cape | RA 55B | departed Kola Inlet December 31; arrived Loch Ewe January 8, 1944 |
Outbound | Homebound | ||
JW 56A | departed Liverpool January 12; arrived Archangel January 28 | ||
JW 56B | departed Liverpool January 22; arrived Kola Inlet February 1 | RA 56 | departed Kola Inlet February 3; arrived Loch Ewe February 11 |
JW 57 | departed Liverpool February 20; arrived Kola Inlet February 28 | RA 57 | departed Kola Inlet March 2; arrived Loch Ewe March 10 |
JW 58 | departed Liverpool March 27; arrived Kola Inlet April 4 | RA 58 | departed Kola Inlet April 7; arrived Loch Ewe April 14 |
(escorts only to Murmansk) | RA 59 | departed Kola Inlet April 28; arrived Loch Ewe May 6 | |
(cycle postponed through summer) | (cycle postponed through summer) | ||
JW 59 | departed Liverpool August 15; arrived Kola Inlet August 25 | RA 59A | departed Kola Inlet August 28; arrived Loch Ewe September 5 |
JW 60 | departed Liverpool September 15; arrived Kola Inlet September 23 | RA 60 | departed Kola Inlet September 28; arrived Loch Ewe October 5 |
JW 61 | departed Liverpool October 20; arrived Kola Inlet September 28 | RA 61 | departed Kola Inlet November 2; arrived Loch Ewe November 9 |
JW 61A | departed Liverpool October 31; arrived Murmansk November 6 | RA 61A | departed Kola Inlet November 11; arrived Loch Ewe November 17 |
JW 62 | departed Loch Ewe November 29; arrived Kola Inlet December 7 | RA 62 | departed Kola Inlet December 10; arrived Loch Ewe December 19 |
JW 63 | departed Loch Ewe December 30; arrived Kola Inlet January 8, 1945 | RA 63 | departed Kola Inlet January 11; arrived Loch Ewe January 21 |
Outbound | Homebound | ||
JW 64 | departed from Clyde February 3; arrived Kola Inlet February 15 | RA 64 | departed Kola Inlet February 17; arrived Loch Ewe February 28 |
JW 65 | departed from Clyde March 11; arrived Kola Inlet March 21 | RA 65 | departed Kola Inlet March 23; arrived Loch Ewe April 1 |
JW 66 | departed from Clyde April 16; arrived Kola Inlet April 25 | RA 66 | departed Kola Inlet April 29; arrived Clyde May 8 |
JW 67 | departed from Clyde May 12; arrived Kola Inlet May 20 | RA 67 | departed Kola Inlet May 23; arrived Clyde May 30 |
The Arctic convoys caused major changes to naval dispositions on both sides, which arguably had a major impact on the course of events in other theatres of war. As a result of early raids by destroyers on German coastal shipping and the Commando raid on Vaagso, Hitler was led to believe that the British intended to invade Norway again. This, together with the obvious need to stop convoy supplies reaching the Soviet Union, caused him to direct that heavier ships, centred on the battleship Tirpitz, be sent to Norway. The Channel Dash was partly undertaken for this reason.[2]
As a "fleet in being", Tirpitz and the other German capital ships tied down British resources which might have been better used elsewhere, for example combating the Japanese in the Indian Ocean. The success of Gneisenau and Scharnhorst in Operation Berlin during early 1941 had demonstrated the potential German threat. However, as the air gap over the North Atlantic closed, Huff-Duff (radio triangulation equipment) improved, airborne centimetric radar was introduced and convoys received escort carrier protection, the scope for commerce raiding diminished.
Aside from an abortive attempt to interdict PQ12 in March 1942 and a raid on Spitsbergen in September 1943, Tirpitz spent most of World War II in Norwegian fjords. She was penned in and repeatedly attacked until she was finally sunk in Tromsø fjord on 12 November 1944 by the RAF. The other Kriegsmarine capital ships never got to Norway (e.g. Gneisenau), were chased off, or were sunk by superior forces (e.g. Scharnhorst). In particular, the unsuccessful attack on convoy JW-51B (the Battle of the Barents Sea), where a strong German naval force failed to defeat a British escort of cruisers and destroyers, infuriated Hitler and led to the strategic change from surface raiders to submarines. Some capital ships were physically dismantled and armament used in coastal defences. .[3]
Leningrad under the siege was one of important destinations for supplies from the convoys. From 1941 food and munition supplies were delivered from British convoys to Leningrad by trains, barges, and trucks. Supplies were often destroyed by the Nazi air-bombings, and by Naval Detachment K while on the way to Leningrad. However, convoys continued deliveries of food in 1942, 1943, and through 1944. Towards the end of the war the material significance of the supplies was probably not as great as the symbolic value hence the continuation—at Stalin's insistence—of these convoys long after the Soviets had turned the German land offensive.[4]
ULTRA intelligence gained from the cracking of the Enigma code at Bletchley Park played an important part in the eventual success of these convoys. Pre-emptive action was not always possible, but the intelligence did allow the Royal Navy to prepare for battle and convoys could be given appropriate escorting forces. The interception and consequent sinking of Scharnhorst by HMS Duke of York was greatly assisted by ULTRA intercepts.[5]
The 1967 Norwegian historic account One in ten had to die (Hver tiende mann måtte dø) by writer Per Hansson is based on the experience of decorated Norwegian sailor Leif Heimstad and other sailors of the Norwegian merchant fleet during World War II.
The 1973 Russian novel Requiem for Convoy PQ-17 (Реквием каравану PQ-17) by writer Valentin Pikul depicts the mission of Convoy PQ 17, reflecting the bravery and courage of ordinary sailors in the merchant ships and their escorts, who took mortal risks to provide Allied aid.
At least two well-known novels were written about the Arctic Convoys: in 1946 HMS Ulysses by Scottish writer Alistair MacLean, considered a classic of naval warfare literature in general, and in 1967 The Captain by Dutch author Jan de Hartog. The two books are very different from each other in style, characterisation and underlying philosophy (de Hartog was a pacifist, which cannot be said about MacLean). Still, they both convey vividly the atmosphere of combined extreme belligerent action and inhospitable nature, pushing protagonists to the edge of endurance and beyond. Both books are evidently inspired by the fate of Convoy PQ-17, though not following its course in detail.
The Arctic route was the shortest and most direct route for lend-lease aid to the USSR, though it was also the most dangerous. Some 3,964,000 tons of goods were shipped by the Arctic route; 7% was lost, while 93% arrived safely.[6] This constituted some 23% of the total aid to the USSR during the war.
Other routes used for the passage of goods were the Persian Corridor and the Pacific Route.
The Persian corridor was the longest route, and was not fully operational until mid 1942. Thereafter it saw the passage of 4,160,000 tons of goods, 27% of the total.[6]
The Pacific route opened in August 1941, but was affected by the start of hostilities between Japan and the US; after December 1941, only Soviet ships could be used, and, as Japan and the USSR observed a strict neutrality towards each other, only non-military goods could be transported.[7] Nevertheless, 8,244, 000 tons of goods went by this route, 50% of the total. [6]
Media related to [//commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Arctic_convoys_of_World_War_II Arctic convoys of World War II] at Wikimedia Commons
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